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818 F AmCHILD tI. RAINES [24 C.2d 
(L. A. No. 18735. In Bank. Aug. 31, 1944.] 
II AZEL FAIRCHILD et al., Respondents, v. ROSS H. 
RAINES et al., Appellants. 
[1] Covenants _ Restrictions-Actions-Findings.-In an action 
to enjoin violation of an agreement between certain owners 
of noncontiguous lots in a tract to restrict use of their prop-
erty to persons of the Caucasian race for a limited period of 
time, it was error not to make findings on a defense, sustained 
by evidence, that since the making of the agreement much of 
the surrounding neighborhood, including u~estricted lots in 
the tract itself, had been occupied by non-Caucasians. 
[2] Id._Restrictions-Actions-Injunction.-The granting of an 
injanction aga.inst violation of an agreement imposing racial 
restrictions on certain noncontiguous lots of a tract rests in 
the dilScretiun of the trial court, in the exercise of which the 
court may consider the proportion of lots subject to restric-
tiuns, the occupuncy of adjoining property, and the length of 
time the rcstrictions are to endure. 
[3] Equity-Relief-Discretion.-The granting or withholding· of 
equitable relief involves the exercise of judicial discretion. 
[4] Covenants - Restrictions - Actions - Injunction.-The fact 
that ther", has been no non-Caucasian occupancy of lots in-
cluued in an agreement of certain lot owners in a tract as 
to the character of occupancy is not controlling on the ques-
tion of the right to an injunction against violation of the 
agreement in respect to a particular lot. 
[5] Id._Restrietions-Actions-Injunction.-Restrictions against 
nOll-Cuu€'asian occupancy of lots in a tract may be enforced 
in a proper case, although all the lots in the tract are not 
subject to the coven.ant. 
[6] Id._Restrictions-Actions-Findings.-In an action to en-
join violation of an agreement as to non-Caucasian occupancy 
of certain lots, a finding as to increase of non-Caucasian oc-
ellpancy near or in the vicinity of such lots, and the absence 
of change in occupancy as to any of the lots except in the 
[1] nange of neighborhood as affecting enforcement of restric-
tive <:(JV('lwnts, note, 54 A.L.R. 812, 85 A.L.R. 985, 103 A.L.R. 734. 
8".', also, Y Cal.Jur. 367; 14 Am.Jur. 646. 
McK. :::>ig. References: [1,6] Covenants, § 112; [2,4,5] Cove-
nants, § 104; [3] Equity, § 19; [7] Trial, § 328. 
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instance complained of, was inadequate in view. of the spcci.9c;y 
allegations of a special defense as to change in conditions and 
of the evidence in support thereof. 
[7] 'Trial-:-Findings-Probative Facts.-The rule as to the non-,.· 
necessity of findings on evidentiary matters when essential 
ultimate facts are found, does not apply in an equity suit 
where probative facts which are material to the exercise 'of' 
judicial discretion and may suffice to constitute' a defense,' 
are pleaded and supported by evidence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frank C. Collier, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enJom defendant negroes from using and oc-
cupying real property, and to enjoin other defendants from 
permitting said negroes to occupy the property. Judgment 
for plaintiffs reversed. 
Lester V. Peterman for Appellants. 
Willis O. Tyler, Loren Miller, George E. Cryer and R. Al-
ston Jones as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
McEachern & Ritchie for Respondents. 
Hahn & Hahn and Lindstrom & Bartlett as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants have appealed from a judg,. 
ment rendered by the court sitting without a jury, by which 
defendants Ross H. Raines and Helen Louise Raines (who are 
colored Americans) are "enjoined and restrained from using, 
occupying or residing prior to the 1st day of January, 1950, 
upon ... Lot No. 43 of the Palisades Tract in the [City 
of Pasadena,] County of Los Angeles, State of California," 
and by which defendants Frank F. Winsell and Mary Win-
sell, his wife (who are Caucasians), are "enjoined and. re~ 
,strained from permitting said defendants . . . [Raines], 
or any other person not of the Caucasian race, to use, occupy 
or live upon said real property prior to the first Jay of 
January, 1950." 
The Palisades Tract is a subdivision in the city of Pasa-
dena embracing a total of sixty-nine lots, of which thirty-one 
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front on Palisade Street (which runs east and 'west) - in the 
block between Arroyo Boulevard on the west and Forest 
Avenue on the east, and the remaining thirty~eight 16ts front 
on the tract boundary streets (Arroyo Boulevard on the west, 
Forest A venue on the east, and Washington Street on the! 
south) and are all contiguous to and, either at the side or 
the rear, abut upon and adjoinsome one. of the lots fronting 
on Palisade Street. At the time of the original subdivision 
apparently no racial restrictions were placed on anyo£:, the 
property in the tract but in 1927 owners representing thirty-
five (possibly only thirty-three) of the 'sixty-nine Jots in the 
tract entered into a contract whereby each signing owner, as. 
a covenant running with the land, agreed to restrict the use 
and occupancy of the property owned by him, up to the 
first day of January, 1950, to persons of the Caucasian race. 
It is apparent from the terms of such contract that the 
signers intended its restrictive covenants to become effective 
as to the several parcels owned by them, respectively, re-
gardless of whether the owners of all or any particular 
number or proportion of the lots in the tract joined init and, 
hence, the cases of Foster v. Stewart (1933), 134 Cal.App. 
482 [25 P.2d 497], and Ober1iJise v. Poulos (1932), 124 Cat 
App. 247 [12 P.2d 156] (in which cases it appears that the 
contracts by their terms were not intended to become effec-
tive until and unless signed by a certain number of property 
owners in the affected tracts), are not controlling. Never-
theless, the number and relative locations of the lots covered 
and not covered by the agreement are material, as herein-
after appears. 
Twenty-eight (possibly twenty-six) of the thirty-one lots 
fronting on Palisade Street, seven of the twelve fronting on 
Arroyo Boulevard, none of the twelve fronting on Forest 
Avenue, and none of the fourteen fronting on' Washington 
Street are covered by the contract. In other words, at least 
thirty-four lots in the tract are not restricted as to racial 
occupation or use. These thirty-four lots comprise three 
(possibly five) fronting on Palisade Street, five fronting on 
Arroyo Boulevard, twelve (all) fronting on Forest Avenue, 
and fourteen (all) fronting on Washington Street. As pre'Vi-
ously mentioned all of the lots fronting on Arroyo Boulevard, 
Forest A venue, and Washington Street are contiguous at 
some point to a lot fronting on Palisade Street.· The lot in 
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controversy (lot' 43) fronts on Palisade Street and adjoins; 
on the east, lot 42, which is restricted, and, on the west, the 
rear of lots 44 and 45 (fronting on Arroyo Boulevard), 
which are not restricted, and the rear of lots 46 and 47, 
which are restricted. At its rear it abuts upon lot 48, which 
is restricted,' and at its southeast corner touches lot 52 
(fronting on Washington Street), whicli is not restricted. 
Directly· across Palisade Street from lot 43 is lot 6, which 
is restricted ;so also is lot 5, which adjoins lot 6 to the 
west, but adjoining a portion (50 feet) of the side of lot 
5 is lot 4 (fronting on Arroyo Boulevard at the corner of 
Palisade Street), which is not restricted. Lots 1, 2, and 
3, . also frontiug on Arroyo Boulevard, likewise adjoin the 
eastside of lot 5, and of these lot 3 is restricted but lots 1 
and 2 are not· restricted. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of certain of the restricted lots 
the fallts as to such ownership, as to the execution and rec-
jll t.he traet. The complaint alleged and the court found 
ordation of the restriction agreement, and that as to lot 
43 (the lot here involved) the agreement was executed by 
the then owners, from whom, by mesne conveyances, de-
fendants Wlnsell acquired title prior to the commencement 
(on June 23, 1942) of this action; that "shortly prior to 
the commencement of this action, defendants . . . Win-
sel . . ~ ,being the owners of' lot 43 of, said Palisades 
Tract, entered into an agreement with defendants . 
Raines, wherein and whereby said [defendants] 
Winsell agreed. . to sell and convey, and said de-
fendants . . . Raines agreed • . . to purchase, said 
lot No. 43 • . . ; that by the terms and conditions of 
. said agreement [defendants] Winsell retain the 
legal title to' said lot 43 until the full purchase price is paid; 
that by the terms and conditions of said agreeinent . .'. 
; [defendants ] Raines 'Were' permitted to enter into posses-
siOIi. of, and to use and occupy and live upon said lot No. 
43; that said . . . [defendants] Raines did, prior. to the 
commencement of this action, enter into possession of, and 
ever since have used and occupied and still do use, . occupy 
and live upon said lot No. 43"; and that defendants Raines 
are of the negro race and their occupation of lot 43 is "con-
·trary to and in violation of" the race restriction agreement 
, . 
\ 
\ 
\ 
, 
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and plaintiffs have thereby "been injured and damaged." 
As a special defense (third affirmative) defendants al-
lege '''fhat at the time of making said agreement [in the 
year 1927] . . . there were no non-Cauccasians using or 
occupying property within several blocks of said Palisades 
Tract. That since the execution of said agreement 
:md particularly within the last five years, non-Caucasian 
occupancy of the premises and in the same tract and block 
[italics added] has expanded with increasing frequency so 
that at the present time a large porportion of the lots in. the 
immediate vicinity and adjoining lots named in said agree-
ment are now occupied. by persons not of the Caucasian 
race but of the negro race and as a consequence thereof, 
said property is not now as desirable for occupancy by per-
sons of the white or Caucasian race . ; that at the 
present time lots 18, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 [which 
front on Palisade Street] are adjoined by lots occupied by 
persons of the negro race; that defendants are informed and 
believe that other lots described in . . . [the agreement] 
are adjoined by lots now occupied by persons who are non-
Caucasians. . . . That as a result of said change in condi-
tions, the enforcement of said agreement . . . would not 
benefit the plaintiffs but would irreparably injure the de-
fendants and the plaintiffs in that the lots in said Palisades 
Tract described in [the agreement] would not be 
occupied by persons of the white race and could not be oc-
cupied by persons who were non-Caucasians." 
[1] In this connection defendants contend that the un-
disputed evidence introduced in support of the third affirm-
ative defense demonstrates such change in the character of 
the surrounding neighborhood (including non-restricted 
lots in the same tract) since the making of the race restric-
tion agreement in 1927 as to bring this case as a matter of 
law within the oft-applied principle that "equity courts 
will not enforce restrictive covenants by injunction in a 
case where, by reason of a change in the character of the 
surrounding neighborhood, not resulting from a breach of 
the covenants, it would be oppressive and inequitable to 
give the restriction effect, as where the enforcement of the 
covenant would have no other result than to harass or injure 
the defendant, without benefiting the plaintiff" (Hurd v. 
Albert (1331), 214 Cal. 15, 23 [3 P.2d 545]; see Downs v. 
Aug. 19M] . F AIRC1ULl) 'U. RAiNtS 
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Kroeger (1927), 200 Cal. 743, 747 [254 P. 1101]; Friesen 
v. City of Glendale (1930), 209 Cal. 524, 529 [268 P. 1080] ; 
Hess v. Country Club Park (1931),213 Cal. 613, 620 [2 P.2d 
782]; Marra v. Aetna Construction Co. (1940), 15 Ca1.2d 
375, 378 [101 P.2d 490]), and that therefore the court erred 
in granting plaintiffs injunctive relief. Particularly it is 
urged that the court erred in failing to make fl.ndings of 
fact resolving the issues raised by such affirmative defense. 
If such issues are material---.:and we conclude that they are-
and if there was competent evidence tending to . establish 
the affirmative of such issues, it was error not to determine 
them by appropriate findings. 
It appears from the bill of exceptions that plaintiff Hazel 
Fairchild, one of the signers of the race restriction agree-
ment, testified that at the time snch agreement was made 
"no colored family lived within several blocks of the re-
stricted area but at the present time there are negro fami-. 
lies living on Del Monte street [immediately] north cl 
Palisades [the street on which most of the lots included in 
the agreement front], on Forrest avenue [immediately] 
east, and Washington street [immediately] south of the 
restricted area; there are no colored persons living within 
the area covered by the . . . agreement except the Haines 
family [defendants] on lot 43; £01' the last several ~'ears a 
colored family has been living on lot 19 [which is within the 
tract and fronts on Palisade Street but is not inchtdpd in 
the agreement], which adjoins lot 18 [included ill the agree-
ment] on the east." 
One H. P. Hammond, a real estate broker, testified on 
behalf of plaintiffs that he had maintainrd his office in Pasa-
dena for "many years"; that "It has been my experience 
that invariably when a negro family moves into a neighbor-
hood theretofore occupied by white people, the ,'a.hie of the 
surrounding property drops fifty per cent. The fact tbat nrgro 
families have moved in and are living on Wasbington street on 
lots directly south of Palisades street would cause the same ce-
crease in realty values." The lots referred to on 'Vashing-
ton Street are within the Palisades Tract. Mr. Hammond 
was the only witness on the subject of damages by reason of 
negro occupancy of premises in the neighborhood and it is 
to be noted that his testimony supports the conclusion t.hat 
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the Palisades Tract is not damaged by the· occupancy of lot 
43 by Mr. and Mrs. Raines; that the damage occasioned that 
neighborhood by negro occupancy had already . been sus~ 
tained by reason of the influx of negroes on Washington 
Street in the same tract. 
Defendant Ross H. Raines testified· that he and his "fam-
ily are living in the house on lot 43 . . . ; .that Del Monte 
is the name of the street directly north of Palisades street, 
and Forrest avenue is directly east, and negro and Mexican 
families live along those streets and on lots adjoining the 
lots restricted; that a negro family lives across the street 
from me down at the end of the block on Jot 19; that there 
is no alley between the lots on Palisades .streetand Washing-
ton street and several families of negroes live along Wash-
ington street on lots that adjoin on the south, lots described 
in the race restriction agreement; that the neighborhood, 
except the lots described in the race restriction agreement, 
is occupied predominantly by negro families." 
Edna Griffin, a physician and surgeon, testified on de-
fendants' behalf that "I maintain my office in Pasadena; 
I am frmiliar with the Horthwest part of Pasadena and par-
ticularly that part wherein is located Palisades, Del Monte, 
Forrest and Washington streets; I have patients living on 
all those stre~ts upon whom I make professional calls and 
those patients are negroes; I know of at least twelve fami-
lies of negroes living on Washington street immediately south 
of Palisades street and west of Forrest; that part of Pasa~ 
dena is occupied predominantly by negroes and is more suit-
able for negroes than for white people." 
One Sadie Wright, called as a witness by defendants, tes-
tified that "I have lived in Pasadena over forty years and 
have been familiar with the area wherein is located Pali-
sades, Del Monte, Forrest and Washington streets since it 
was an orange grove; that over twenty years ago only white 
people lived in that area but at the present time, with the 
exception of the lots covered by the race restriction agree-
ment, it is occupied principally by negroes. and is more suit-
able for the occupaIicy of negroes than of white - people. " 
It is thus established . by the testimony of on~ of plaintiffs 
themselves-the witness Hazel Fairchild-that since . the 
making of the agreement the several restricted parcels haye 
Aug. 1944] FAIRCHILD 1). RAINES 
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become substantially surrounded, in the same tract and 
block, on three sides by negro residents, and by the testi-
!r.ony of plaintiffs' witness Hammond· that the presence of 
negro residents on Washington Street (in the same tract) 
effected a decrease in value of plaintiffs' property within the 
tract independently of the presence of defendants Raines 
on lot 43. The testimony of defendants' witnesses further 
tends to establish that the neighborhood, including the very 
block in the Palisades Tract in which the restricted property 
is located, is now predominantly negro, "more suitable for 
negroes than for white people," and that several of the lots 
included in the agreement are adjoined by lots on which 
negroes reside. Likewise material is the fact that by the 
terms of the agreement its restrictive covenants will expire 
in a little more than five years from this date. 
[2] On behalf of plaintiffs it is contended that the third 
affirmative defense and the above epitomized evidence sup-
porting it are entirely immaterial; that under the circum-
stances related the plaintiffs' right to· injunctive relief is 
absolute and that there is no field for the exercise of judi-
cial discretion as to the granting or withholding of such re-
lief. Weare unable to sustain plaintiffs in this contention. 
It appears to us that sonnd judicial philosophy demands 
that a measure of discretion be permitted the trial court in 
the premises. If we were to uphold the view of the plain-
tiffs that covenants such as those here involved must in any 
circumstances be enforced absolutely without regard to the 
number or proportion of lots in a tract subjected to the re-
strictiolls, without consideration of the occupancy and use 
of the adjoining property or of the length of time during 
which the imposed restrictions are to endure, we would ig-
nore principles of equity which are fundamental. If the 
above related circumstances are legally immaterial under 
the facts of this cuse, then they would be immaterial if they 
showed that only two lots of a tract were restricted although 
all others were free and were occupied by colored Americans 
and even though only five months or five weeks instead of 
dve years remained in the life of the restrictions. We . are 
of the view that, subject to certain broad principles, each 
case of this character must be determined upon the facts 
peculiar to it. . 
. ii 
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[3] It is the general rule that the granting or withhold-
ing of equitable relief involves the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. (Vesper v. Forest Lawn Oemetery Assn. (1937), 
20 Cal.App.2d 157, 163 [67 P.2d 368] ; Diederichsen v. Sutch 
(1941), 47 Cal.App.2d 646, 649 [118 P.2d 863].) It is like-
wise true, as a general rule, that "the equity courts will not 
enforce restrictive covenants by injunction in a case where, 
by reason of a change in the character of the surrounding 
neighborhood, not resulting from a breach of the covenants, 
it would be' oppressive and inequitable to give the restriction 
effect, as where the enforcement of the covenant would have 
no other result than to harass or injure the defendant, with-
out benefiting the plaintiff." (Hurd v. Albert (1931), supra, 
214 Cal. 15, 22.) As was said in Trustees of Oolumbia Ool-
lege v. Thacher (1882), 87 N.Y. 311, 317 [41 Am.Rep. 365, 
367], "It certainly is not the doctrine of courts of equity, to 
enforce, by its peculiar mandate, every contract, in all cases, 
even where specific execution is found to be its legal intention 
and effect. It gives or withholds such decree according to its 
discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case . . . 
And so, though the contract was fair and just when made, the 
interference of the court. should be denied, if subsequent 
events have made performance by the defendant so onerous, 
that its enforcement would impose great hardship upon him, 
and cause little or no benefit to the plaintiff." (Quoted and 
followed in Downs v. Kroeger (1927), supra, 200 Cal. 743, 
747; cf. Walker v. Haslett (1919),44 Cal.App. 394, 398, 401 
[186 P. 622], wherein, although an injunction was directed, 
it was made without prejudice to future modification "be-
cause possible future changes in the' condition of the neigh-
borhood may entitle defendant toa modification or even a 
dissolution.") Also, as to the duration of restrictions and 
their enforcibility it has been said that "the sound course is 
. to hold that where the purpose of the restriction can no 
longer be carried out the servitude comes to an end; that 
the duration of the servitude is determined by its purpose. " 
(Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913), 381.) 
[4] Plaintiffs emphasize that there had been no change 
in "Negro or non-Caucasian occupancy" of the lots included 
in the agreement until the occupancy by defendants Raines 
of lot 43. This is a material fact admitted by defendants 
but it is not necessarily controlling here. In an area as 
-------------------
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small as that involved in this case (some thirty-five of the 
sixty-nine lots in the entire tract) and where the restricted 
lots do not form a single contiguous group, it would not 
seem essential that the occupancy of any of such restricted 
lots themselves should have undergone the critical change if 
it has occurred in the very neighborhood of which they are 
a continguous part geographically and, apparently, in social 
aspects. Indeed, it is obvious that a change in the race 
character of the neighborhood, without violation of the cove-' 
nants of the agreement, could occur only through a change 
in the occupancy of neighboring lots not included in the 
agreement. (See Downs v. Kroeger (1927), supra~ 200 Cal. 
743; cf. Jewett v. Albin (1928), 90 Cal.App. 535, 543, 546 
[266 P. 329].) 
The contention of plaintiffs that the proposition of law 
declared in the case of Downs v. Kroeger, supra (a restric,: 
tion against other than residential use), has no application 
to a race restriction case cannot be sustained. (SeeLetteau 
v. Ellis (1932), 122 Cal.App. 584, 588 [10 P.2d 496].) It 
is, of course, true that race restriction agreementS as to the 
use and occupancy of real property are normally. r~cognized 
as valid (Los Angeles Investment 00." v. Gary (1919), 181 
Cal. 680, 683-684 [186 P. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115]) and'~Iiforcible 
by injunction (Wayt v. Patee (1928), 205 Ca146,49~50 
[269 P. 660]). It is also true that where. all, or perhaps. 
substantially all, of the continguous lots of a tract of sub-
stantial extent are subject to race restrictions the courts 
should not fail to enforce the covenants as to the restricted' 
area merely because surrounding property eventually is put 
to the use and occupation prohibited to the' restricted area . 
(See Porter v. Johnson (1938), 232 Mo.App. 1150, 1158 
[115 S.W.2d 529].) Obviously the precise purpose of the cove-
nants is to avert changes in the restricted territory, not in: 
the surrounding neighborhood, and they can have no legal 
efficacy beyond the area of the tract to which they are applic-
able. The mere fact that a change in the character of the 
use of neighboring property may make free use of restricted 
property more profitable does not warrant failure to enforce 
the restriction "if the original purpose of the covenant can. 
still be realized." (Marra v. Aetna Oonstruction 00. (1940), 
supra, 15 Cal.2d 375, 378, a building restriction case.) 
,"", 
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[5]:Here the third aftlrmativedefense places before the 
trial court the question as to whether the original purpose 
of the restrictive covenant can still be realized by the owners 
of the lots which front upon Palisade Street. The fact that 
all the lots in the tract are not subject to the covenant is not 
conclusive of the issue. Even if restrictions are not enforci-
ble as to every lot in an area originally covered by an agree-
ment they may be upheld as to a part of that area if such part 
is of sufficient extent and so located that the original purpose 
of the restrictions can be accomplished. (Downs v. Kroe-
ger (1927), supra, 200 Cal. 743, 749.) 
On behalf of plaintiffs emphasis has been placed on the 
case of Grady v. Garland (1937), (U.S.C.A.,D.C.), 89 F.2d 
817 [67 App.D.C. 73]. That case, however, not only fails 
to sustain the proposition that the right of plaintiffs to an 
injunction is absolute but rather tends to lend support to our 
view that an exercise of judicial discretion is involved. 
Plaintiffs there sought to quiet their title to six of a group 
of eight adjoining lots as against a covenant as to each of 
the eight lots that "said lot shall never be rented, leased, 
sold, transferred or conveyed unto any negro or colored 
person under a penalty of two thousand dollars." Upon 
the pleading itself the complaint was dismissed. The court 
said (at p. 818): "While it is true that the averments of 
the bill are admitted by the motion to dismiss, we think the 
bill wholly fails to allege facts sufficient to justify the grant-
ing of the relief sought. The bill merely alleges, in effect, 
that by reason of the occupancy by colored persons of the 
territory immediately west of the property in question, plain-
tiffs' property has been damaged and that it could not result 
in damage to the defendants to have the restriction removed. 
These are merely conclusions, not supported by any facts al-
leged in the bill, since there are no averments to the effect that 
the property has been rendered less valuable for rental pur-
poses or for sale, or that the character of the environment 
would make it unfit or unprofitable for use by the enforcement 
of the restriction, or that a material change has occurred in 
the environment since plaintiffs acquired title to their respec-
tive properties-all of which are fact.., important to be con-
sidered in an action for the removal of the restri4tion." The 
facts recited in the quoted statement distinguish that case 
from the one at bar. '1'he facts enumerated as "important to 
Aug. 1944] F AmCHILD v. RAINES 
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be considered in an action for the removal of the restriction," 
which facts were not averred in the complaint there, are, in 
substance, the very facts which are alleged in the third 
affirmative defense here and which plaintiffs assert are im-
material. 
In the Grady case, supra, the court further said (at p.819) : 
"It might be that under such circumstances [where the mat-
ters complained of were foreign to the grounds on which the 
restriction was based] surrounding conditions would be suffi-
cient to justify the removal of the restriction, but the restric-
tion here is against the disposal of the property in question 
to colored people, and the complaint now is that colored peo-
ple are living in the adjoining neighborhood [italics added], 
to the damage of these complainants. The restriction is for 
the protection of the property to which it applies, and is not 
affected by similar conditions which may arise in adjoining 
property. Castleman v. Avignone, 56 App.D.C. 253,12 F.2d 
326. The object of the restriction here was to prevent the 
invasion of the restricted property by colored people, not 
the invasion of property surrounding it. 
"If the facts here alleged were sufficient in equity to justify 
the setting aside of the covenant of restriction, all that would 
be necessary to defeat such a covenant would be the settle-
ment of a few colored families in the immediate vicinity of the 
restricted areas. . . . 
"A mere glance at the present situation demonstrates the 
protection which the restriction is to the defendants . . . 
It furnishes a complete barrier against the eastward move-
ment of colored population into the restricted area-a di-
viding line." 
But in the case before us there is no "complete barrier." 
Upon the evidence introduced it appears that not only the 
"surrounding neighborhood" but the very tract and block 
of which the restricted lots are a part has been invaded. As 
previously set out the witness Sadie Wright testified-and 
she was not disputed-in reference to the entire Palisades 
Tract "that over twenty years ago only white people lived 
in that area but at the present time, with the exception of 
the lots covered by the race restriction agreement, it is oc-
cupied principally by negroes and is more suitable for the 
occupancy of negroes than of white people." Since the 
lots covered by the agreement are not a contiguous group 
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and do not constitute a complete barrier or dividing line as 
to any whole tract or block or other well-defined area or 
neighborhood, and since lot 43 (the mooted lot) is adjoined 
on one side by two unrestricted lots and is otherwise situ-
ated as hereinbefore described, it is onr conclusion that the 
record cannot be held to establish an absolute right in plain-
tiffs to the injunction against the use and occupancy of the 
mentioned lot· by defendants Raines. The failure of the 
trial court to specifically find on the issues raised by the 
third affirmative' defense therefore becomes material. 
[6] The only finding of the trial court directed to the 
issues raised by such special defense is that "As to the 
allegations of. [such defense], the court finds that 
since 1927 negro and Mexican occupancy of properties has 
increased near or in the vicinity of the lots described in said 
race restriction agreement, but that there has been no change 
in negro occupancy as to any of the lots described in said 
race restriction agreement, except the occupancy complained 
of in this action." Such finding, in the light of the more 
specific allegations of the defense, and of the evidence tend-
ing to support those allegations, is not adequate and, hence, 
does not establish that plaintiffs are entitled to the injunc-
tive relief granted. 
[7] Where a trial court makes findings upon all essen-
tial ultimate facts it is not error to fail to find upon eviden-
tial matters (see Williams v. Mf}Dowell (1939), 32 Cal.App. 
2d 49, 52 [89 P.2d 155] ; Ryan v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 00. 
(1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 460, 464 [126 P.2d 401]) but this 
rule is not applicable in an 'equity ~mit where probative facts, 
which are material to the exercise of sound judicial discre-
tion in the premises, and which may be sufficient to consti-
tute a defense against the relief sought, are pleaded and are 
supported by competent evidence. Since, under such cir-
cumstances, the probative facts as pleaded in themselves 
constitute material issues, the rule stated in James v. Haley 
(1931),212 Cal. 142, 147 [297 P. 920], is controlling: "Ever 
sinee the adoption of the codes, it has been the rule that 
findings are required on all material issues raised by the 
pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the 
court renders judgment without making findings on all ma-
terial issues, the case must be reversed." (See also Kr-wm 
v. Malloy (1943), 22 Cal.~d 132, 136 [137 P.2d 18].) 
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For the reasons hereinabove stated the judgment is re-
versed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. In my opinion 
the findings of the trial conrt fail not only to provide an 
adequate' basis for determining whether enforcement of the 
restriction in the light of changed conditions would impose 
great hardship upon the defendants with little or no benefit 
to the plaintiffs (Trustees of Oolumbia Oollege v. Thacher, 
87 N.Y. 311, 317 [41 Am.Rep. 365, 367]), but to consider 
whether enforcement would be contrary to the public interest 
in the use of land in urban communities where people are 
concentrated in limited areas. 
The public policy against restricting the free use of land 
finds expression in the rule that an instrument creating an 
equitable servitude must be strictly construed and any doubts 
resolved in favor of the free use of the land. (Werner v. 
Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 181 [183 P. 945]; Marra v. Aetna 
Oonstruction 00., 15 Cal.2d 375, 378 [101 P.2d 490].) Again, 
building restrictions imposed by private agreement between 
landowners cannot stand in the way of the' pliblic interest. 
Thus in Friesen v. Oity of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524 [268 P. 
1080], covenantors entitled to the restrictive use of land 
were denied compensation for its use as a public street on 
the ground that the interest under a restrictivecovenatl~ 
"is not a property right, but is a contractual right cognizable 
in equity as between the contracting parties, not binding on 
the sovereign contemplating a public use of the particular 
property taken." (209 Cal. 524, 531; see 19 Cal.L.Rev. 58). 
In Sackett v. Los Angeles Oity School Dist., 118 Cal.App. 
254 [5 P.2d 23], the court held that a schoo~ district was 
not bound by a covenant restricting the use of lots to resj~ . 
dential purposes, but was free to use the land for school 
playground purposes. The court stated, "the state and,its 
various political subdivisions may not be bound by the terms 
of a private contract to which it was not a party (United 
States v. Oertain Lands, 112 F. 622; Doan v. Cleveland Short 
Line Ry 00., 92 Ohio St. 461 [112 N.E. 505]; Friesen v.· 
~2 :ill AIRCliILD V. 1tUNES ·(24 C;2d 
C~ty-ofGiendale; supra). Public policy has been den~mi. 
naiedavague and uncertain guide at best (Miller & Lux v. 
Madera Canal etc. Co., 155 Cal. 59 [22 L.R.A. N. S. 391., 99 
P. 502]), but instances arise that call for its application. 
The present action is one that does. It presents the situa-
tion of an agency of the state created for the sole purpose of 
providing adequate educational facilities for the youth of a 
certain limited area against whom there is sought to be in-
voked the aid of equity to enforce a restriction created by the 
provisions of a private contract to which the state was in 
nowise a party and by which it neither expreesly nor by 
necessary implication consented to be bound. The state may 
not be thus hampered in carrying out a purpose in which 
it is so vitally interested." (118 Cal.App. 254, 258.) In 
Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15 [3 P.2d 545], a tract restricted 
to residential purposes became enclosed in a business district 
as the city of Los Angeles developed. The public interest 
in the development of the city rendered the agreement un-
emorceable, even though its beneficiaries retained some in-
terest in its emorcement. In Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal.App. 
584, 588 [10 P.2d 496], the court held that a restriction 
against occupancy of land by persons of negro descent was 
unenforceable because of changed conditions, stating: "We 
find it needless to follow appellants' arguments on the tech-
nical rules and distinctions made between conditions, cove-
nants and mere restrictions . . . A principle of broad 
public policy has intervened to the extent that modern prog-
ress is deemed to necessitate a sacrifice to many former 
claimed individual rights. The only obstacle met has been 
the rule of property or as termed the disinclination to dis-
turb vested property rights. To some extent this, too, has 
yielded in the sense that many rights formerly labeled as 
p:r:operty rights by a process of academic relation are now 
considered merely personal and have been SUbjected to the 
common good." (See also, Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N.Y. 
243 [104 N.E. 629]; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co. Inc., 
244 N.Y. 22 [154 N.E. 652] ; 14 Columb.L.Rev. 438; 3 Tiffany, 
Real Property (1939) 522.) 
In the present case there is a public interest in the conges-
tion . of the limited residential districts for colored people. 
Tllat congestion is a consequence of residential segregation 
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flf the coloreJ popu1:ltion acconplishedj not by ordi~ances, 
w~lich w~uld be U1!COl:stituti(oDal (Buchanan v. Warley, 2-15 
U K 60· [3~ S.Ot. 16, 62 L.Ell, 149, 210 Ann;Cas.191 RK 
1201]; IIarmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 6~::) [47 S.Ct.471, 71 L.Ed. 
e31]; City of Richmond v. De(lns, 37 F.2il 7i2, atr'd 281 .. 
U.S. 704 [50 S.Ot. 4.07, 74 L.EJ. 112S]; City of Dallas v. 
Liberty Anne.:: Corp. (Tcx.Civ.Apl'.), 19 S.\v;2d 845; see 
16 C.J.S. 1474; HU:ltilll;, The Constitutionality of Race Dis-
tinction-s and the Baltimore Negro SeGregation Ordinanoe, 
11 Coltunb.L.Hev. 23; Minor, Constitutionality af Segrega-
tion Ordtnc/fI,ces, 18 Va.L.nev. 561; Benson, Segregation 
Ordi1l.lmces, 1 Vn.L.Rev.(l';.s') 330; Mangnm, The Le!!,al Stat-
us of t!le Negro, p. 138 et &eq.), but by ngreCl:lents between 
private persohs, which t.1.e courts have recog!lized· as valid. 
(Corri!jtt;n v. Duc;rcley, 271 U.S. 323 [46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.EJ. 
9C9]; Los Al'geles Inv. Co. v. Gary, rn Cal.CSO [186 P. 
59€, 9 A.L.R. 115] ; Jenss Inv. Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal. 753 
[239 P. 34]; Qucensborou:Jh Lend Co. v. Ct:ze:Jux, 131) La. 
72-1 [67 So. 641, Ann.C:ls.131GD 1248, L.R.A.1nGB 1201]; 
r~rmalee v. Morris, 21':; Mich. 625 [188 X.W. 330, 3B 
_A.L.R. 1180]; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373 [206 N.W. 
5~2, 42 A.L.U. 1267] ; United C001Jerctive Realty Co. v. Hawk. 
ins, 2(:9 Ky. 563 [108 S.W.2d 507] ; sec Bruce, Rccial Zoning 
by Pn'Cl'Jto Contract in the Ught of the COllstitution and the 
Rule _1:;:li11st llcsirllhlt on Alic1tation, 21 IlLJ.J.Hcv. 704; Mar-
tk, Se(Jregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721; 23 Cal.L. 
Rev. 361; Mangum, op. cit. p. 147; ct. Gandolfo v. Ha,rtman, 
4!J F. 181 [16 L.R.A. 277] ; Rutledge, J., concurring in H1t'n-
dky v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23, 25.) 
The problem of race segregation cannot be soh-eJ by the 
courts alone, for it involves emotions and connrfions too 
deeply imbedded ill the social outlook of men to be uprooted 
oVl'rnight by judicial pronouut!cments. Nevert~el!.'ss the 
problem must be confronted step by step, however prO'l,i-· 
sional the solution, with rl'g'ard both for t~c int!.'rests of mi. 
llOrity p-oups and the general public interl·st. It D.a:;t be 
rec')gnizcd that the stea,iy m~~ration ",r southern :leh'r"('s 
a:1,J the influx of ncg1"':'('S in1;A> urban OO! l:::lu:!iticO in rl:S?, ::se 
to the incrcllsing uCl!lnn~ls of in lustry !l.r lah ... r, t .. gct~cr 
with race scgregation (s,ee KentlOtty, The Ne.,--ro Pt,as:mt 
TUr'-1s City-ward, eh. II, The Causes of Migratiun, p. 41; 
,. CUd-" 
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Woofter, Negro Problems in Citie~, ch. II, The Rapid city 
Growth, p. 26; Sterner, The Negro's Share, A Study of In-
come, Consumption, Housing, and Public ASMstanee, pp. 186-
209; Martin, Segregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721), 
have made it impossible for many negroes to find decent 
housing in large centers of population. The report of the 
Committee on Negro Housing of the President's Conference 
on Home Building and Home Ownership (1932) page 3, 
states: "Cities of the North . . . have shown increases 
rangin~ from 10 to 600 per cent. Chicago's Negro popula-
tion in 1910 was 44,103; in 1930 it had increased to 233,903. 
Philadelphia's increased from 84,459 in 1910 to 219,599 in 
1930, and that of New York ... from 91,709 to 327,706." 
In recent years there has been a large negro migration into 
Southern California. The census of 1940 shows an increase 
of the colored population of Los Angeles from 67,348 in 1930 
to 97,847 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1942, 
78th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document No. 53, p. 29), 
and the war has accelerated the pace of this migration. 
Negroes migrating into urban communities have found 
barriers at every turn. "Segregation . . . has kept the 
Negro-occupied sections of cities throughout the country fa-
tally unwholesome places, a. menace to the health, morals and 
~eneral decency of cities, and 'plague spots for race exploita-
tion, friction and riots.' " (Report of the Committee on 
Negro Housing of the President's Conference on Home Build-
ing and Home O,vnership, pp. 45 and 46.) The choice lies 
between the continuation of such conditions and the expan-
sion of urban negro districts. Race restriction agreements, 
undertaking to do what the state cannot, must yield to the 
public interest in the sound development of the whole com-
munity. The courts, as the agencies of the state confronted 
with the problem of enforcing racial zoning by private agree-
ments, must consider all of the factors that affect the public 
interest. It is pertinent to recall the words of Judge Cardozo 
in his concurring opinion in Adler v. Deegan, ~1 N.Y. 467, 
484 [167 N.E. 705, 711]: "The Multiple Dwelling Act is 
aimed at many evils, but most of all it is n measure to erad-
Icate the slum. It seeks to bring about conditions whereby 
healthy children shall be born, and healthy men and women 
reared, in the dwellings of the great metropolis. To have 
such men a,nd W<'>IIlen is n<.>t a city concern IIlerely. It is the 
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concern of the whole state. Here is to be bred the citizenry 
with which the State must do its work in the ycars that are 
to come. The end to be achieved is more than the avoidance 
of pestilence or contagion. The end to be achieved is the 
quality of men and women . . . If the moral. and physical 
fibre of its manhood and womanhood is not a State concern, 
the question is, what is Y " . 
In the present case a residential district populated by 
colored people now surrounds the restricted area on three 
sides. The question whether the restricted area shall stand 
as a. barrier against expansion of the negro district cannot 
be determined entirely by findings with regard to property 
values and the interests of property owners. It is also nec-
essary to determine whether maintenance of. this barrier 
would deprive the colored population of any feasible access 
to additional housing and compress it within the inflexible 
boundaries of its present district at the risk of a congestion 
whose evils would inevitably burst the bounds of that district. 
The trial court should therefore be directed to make findings 
as to the housing facilities available in the district occupied 
by the colored population and to determine whether there 
is a need for additional housing that would justify an expan-
sion of the district by absorption of the restricted area. 
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. AMOS FRANKLIN CLAPP, 
et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Accomplices-Who Are.-Under 
Pen. Code, § 1111, the mere fact that a witness is pun-
ishable for cooperation with the defendant in the illegal trans-
action does not make him an accomplice. 
[2] Id.-Evidencs-A,cCOlDplices-Who Are.-In case of crimes 
requiring two or more pCl'!!ons for .their commission, a specific 
provision for punishing acts of certain participantp super-
sedes Pen. Code, § 31, subjecting such participante in the 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2J Criminal Law, § 574;[3J Abor-
tion, § 6. 
